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The Digital Services Tax as a Tax on Location-Specific Rent
Wei Cui* and Nigar Hashimzade†
Abstract: In 2018, the European Council and the UK and Spanish governments each proposed to
introduce a Digital Services Tax (DST), to be levied on the revenue of large digital platforms from
advertising, online intermediation, and/or the transmission of data. We offer a rationalization of the DST
as a tax on location-specific rent (LSR). That is, just as many countries already levy royalties on rent from
extracting natural resources, one can think of the DST as levied on rent earned by digital platforms from
particular locations. We provide stylized illustrations of how platform rent can be assigned to specific
locations, even when users from multiple jurisdictions participate. We then elaborate the analogy
between the DST and resource royalties and analyze the DST’s incidence and effect on private and social
welfare using a simple model. Finally, we argue that the DST suggests useful directions for redesigning
international taxation in the age of labor-replacing AI technology.
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Introduction
On 24 July 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron signed legislation enacting the digital
services tax (DST), thereby giving real life to a tax policy idea that, though virtually unheard of before
2018, has become perhaps the most controversial subject in international taxation. The French DST, a
3% tax levied on the revenue of large digital platform companies earned from advertising, online
intermediation, or the transmission of data, is modeled on a similarly-named tax that had been
proposed in March 2018 as a European Council Directive (European Commission 2018). The United
Kingdom (UK) government had also staked out its own DST in March 2018, and in July 2019 released
detailed proposed legislative language, draft administrative guidance, as well as further policy
explanations (HM Revenue and Customs 2019a and 2019b; HM Treasury 2019). Spain, Austria, and the
Czech Republic have also introduced DST legislation.
Just as importantly as these national developments, the European Commission (EC), UK and
French DSTs have spurred into action one of the highest-profile and highest-stake negotiation processes
in recent years at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In May 2019,
the OECD announced a “Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges
Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy”, which explicitly considers, in addition to several other
proposals, methods that refer to “user participation” for revising the profit allocation rules under
international income taxation (OECD 2019a, b). In September 2019, Margrethe Vestager, the incoming
EC vice president, indicated that if no effective agreement is reached at the OECD by the end of 2020,
the EC would enact a European Union-wide DST. This was followed by the OECD Secretariat Proposal
(OECD 2019c) for a “Unified Approach” released for public consultations in October 2019. In the
meantime, the United States government and U.S. multinationals have bitterly protested against the
French DST, with Donald Trump threatening retaliatory tariffs against imports from France. The
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sentiment is widely expressed that if the U.S. cannot stop the French DST, similar taxes would certainly
proliferate.
Despite its frequent appearance in news headlines in the last year, the DST remains poorly
understood by the public. Before its proposal by national governments and the EC, the DST had no
intellectual proponent: as far as we are aware, it was not anticipated in the existing public finance or
other academic literature.1 Critics often portray the DST as nothing more than a protectionist tariff, or at
best a poorly-designed cascading tax on consumption (Congressional Research Service 2019). Some
commentators go further in demonizing the DST, asserting that it violates income tax treaties, World
Trade Organization rules, and European Union principles, creates unacceptable double taxation,
represents aggressive unilateral action and bad faith in international relations, and/or fails to achieve its
intended purpose. The news media has tended to parrot these allegations, frequently also conflating the
DST with the value added tax imposed on imported digital services. Even OECD officials, perhaps hoping
to leverage the opposition to the DST to induce commitment to an OECD consensus, have taken to
portray the DST as something to be avoided at all costs.
In contrast to this prevailing negative discourse about the DST, we offer a justification of the DST
as a tax on location-specific rent (LSR). That is, just like royalties levied by many national and subnational governments on revenue from natural resource extraction, the DST can be thought of as a tax
on economic rents earned by digital platform companies from particular locations. Once the DST is
analogized to resource royalties, it immediately becomes transparent that many of the legal objections
against the DST are misguided. For instance, just as income tax treaties typically do not cover resource
royalties, the DST is almost certainly not a “covered tax” and poses no threat to tax treaties. It is also
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Taxes on advertising revenue and subscription fees earned by digital platforms are discussed in France Stratégie
2015, Bourreau et al 2018, Kind & Koethenbuerger 2018, Belleflamme & Toulemonde 2018, Kind et al. (2008,
2009a, 2009b, 2010), and other recent theoretical literature, but generally within the domestic context.
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highly distinct from tariffs and unlikely to trigger WTO scrutiny. Finally, it is standard practice to offer
only a deduction, and not a foreign tax credit, under the income tax for foreign taxes on LSR, so that
there should be no presumption that the DST should be creditable.
To justify the DST as a tax on LSR, one must be able to show that (1) digital platforms earn
substantial rent, and that (2) such rent can be traced to particular user countries when platforms
operate internationally. Regarding the first point, the literature on the economics of platforms strongly
suggests that large economic rent is possible, because of direct and indirect network effects.2 Moreover,
the existence of monopoly rent is compatible with the observations that substantial investments may
have to be made to capture it, and that, during periods when firms aim to build market share, they can
show low accounting profits or even persistent losses. We rely on the existing economic literature on
multi-sided business models to support the plausibility of these intuitions. Our more original arguments
concern the second point—how platform rent can be traced to particular jurisdictions.
Analogizing the activities of platform users to natural resources seems easy in some instances.
For example, data generated by user activity, to the extent that such data have significant economic
value, can be viewed as similar to natural resources with definite locations (IMF, 2019). However, the
most important tax base for the DST in the near future is likely to be revenue from advertising and
intermediation of consumption transactions. To see such business models as generating LSR, two
observations are useful. First, when a technology’s deployment in one country has no opportunity cost
in terms of its simultaneous deployment in other countries—when the use of that technology is nonrival—it is plausible to attribute any rent generated by such technology from its deployment in a given
country to that country. This is so even if the technology can be deployed remotely, and even if the
technology is invented elsewhere. Second, in some instances, it may be possible to identify causal
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Rysman 2009, Levin 2011, Weyl & White 2014, White 2012, Evans & Schmalensee 2015.
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origins of platform rent: new producer or consumer surplus arise because of changes in one of the
jurisdictions where platform users reside.
Indeed, we believe that these two observations correspond to two genuinely new problems in
international taxation which are of interest independently of the DST (but to which DST proposals
provide attractive solutions). The first is that the non-rival use and remote deployment of digital
technology generate a significant new class of LSR that the international tax system has not previously
recognized. The second is that two-sided business models operating at a global scale create
misalignments between sources of value creation and origins of payment. Recognizing these problems is
crucial to understanding the DST, and the first intended contribution of our paper is to provide a clear
statement of these problems.
Of course, the multi-sided market business models of digital platforms differ from natural
resource extraction in many ways. The economic incidence and welfare effects of a DST levied on digital
service revenue depend on a highly complex array of factors, which has been explored in the existing
literature only in a limited fashion. In the second contribution of our paper, we model the incidence of
ad valorem tax levied on the platform’s sales revenues in the presence of indirect externalities. We
calculate the effect of tax on the platform and on the two types of users, buyers and sellers/advertisers,
in the presence of indirect externalities and relate it to the sign and the extent of the externalities. We
show that tax can be beneficial (raise the surplus) for buyers or sellers, or, indeed, for both types of
users. Finally, we derive the necessary conditions for the tax to be welfare-improving: it must be the
case that tax leads to an increase in the number of advertisers on the platform. This holds when both
indirect externalities are positive with at least one being sufficiently weak, or when the indirect
externality from sellers to buyers is negative (more sellers/advertisers make platform less attractive for
buyers).
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A third contribution of our paper is to put the DST within a familiar tax policy frameworks. For
example, the choice between a revenue-based tax and a tax defined over a rent base is familiar in the
context of taxing natural resources. The existing literature on natural resource taxation recognizes that
revenue-based taxes are easier to implement and more robust against tax planning than the latter, as
well as providing revenue to governments earlier. Rent taxes are less distortionary, but both practically
and politically more challenging to put into effect. Moreover, both (revenue-based) royalties and rent
taxes are frequently adopted alongside the corporate income tax, and the latter displays a mixture of
the advantages and flaws of the first two tax instruments. The simultaneous imposition of these
different taxes is no more objectionable in the digital sphere than in the natural resource sector.
The only existing economic analyses of the DST we are aware of (developed independently from
and simultaneously with our paper) are found in Pellefigue (2019) and Richter (2019). Pellefigue (2019)
provides informal arguments concerning the French DST’s incidence. More notably, Richter (2019)
demonstrates that when digital services can be delivered remotely at zero marginal cost, it may be
rational even for small countries to impose tariff-like taxes on the remote delivery of digital services.
Richter (2019) argues (in our view correctly) that the remote delivery of services at zero marginal cost
raises vital international tax policy questions to which the traditional international tax framework, which
focuses on permanent establishments and transfer pricing to determine the scope of source country
taxation, provides no relevant guidance (for related arguments, see Cui 2019). We also agree with
Richter that the growing international trade in digital services is likely to remain asymmetrical, because
technological innovation is likely to be characterized by agglomeration effects. Indeed, we believe this is
why it is important to articulate intuitions about how rent from technology deployment should be
attributed. Our paper differs from Richter (2019) in two main respects. First, the DST Richter models is a
tariff-like tax on business-to-business transactions (e.g. cloud-computing). The main applications of the
French, UK, and EC DSTs as discussed in 2019, however, are not tariff-like and feature online
6

intermediation involving consumers. Our model thus better fits the actual DSTs. Second, we emphasize
normative intuitions about attributing rent to locations. In effect, we highlight senses in which service
importing countries may not only be rational (in terms of national-welfare-maximization) in imposing
DSTs, but also be reasonable and acting fairly in doing so.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 sets out the basic arguments about how
rent earned by digital platforms can be traced to specific locations—even when users from multiple
jurisdictions participate. It also explains why these forms of LSR are neglected under the traditional
international taxation framework. Section 2 then discusses how the DST can be analogized to resource
royalties. Section 3 sets out an economic model that explores the DST’s incidence and impact on
welfare. Finally, in Section 4 we briefly discuss why conceiving of platform rent as location specific (as
we propose) has far reaching consequences, and why it might become especially relevant in the age of
asymmetrical technological growth.

1. Location-specific platform rent
Governments proposing the DST appeal to the notion of “user value creation”: digital platforms
derive their profit from the value-generating activities of their users (EC 2018, HM Treasury 2019). Many
critics have dismissed this concept as hopelessly metaphorical. In contrast, we believe that “user value
creation” potentially affords precise interpretations: it does not merely acknowledge that there are
different types of participants in platform profit generation; instead it articulates specific and
normatively appealing ways in which platform rent can be attributed to particular locations.
Consider a stylized example of a digital platform, Googl (based on Google, one of the companies
subjected to the DST). Suppose that Googl’s technology is developed in the United States and its
entrepreneurs reside there. Among many of its interfaces designed for users in different countries,
Googl has an interface in French mainly targeted at individual users in France. Googl operates servers in
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a low-tax jurisdiction, say Ireland, to support its search engine and multiple interfaces. Googl’s IPholding subsidiary, where most of its profit is booked, is also formed in Ireland. Finally, suppose Googl
earns advertising revenue from German carmakers who wish specifically to target French consumers.
Googl’s marginal cost from its main revenue-generating business, targeted placement of advertisement
based on user searches, is close to zero. Therefore, the revenue Googl earns from German producers for
ads targeted at French consumers is roughly its gross profit from this line of business. Suppose that after
allocating and deducting non-marginal costs (e.g. electricity, server, etc.) that Googl incurs in Ireland
against this profit, a net profit remains. Such profit represents a form of quasi-rent: it would not have
been possible without large upfront investments and ongoing R&D expenses incurred by Googl.
For such profit to be realized, the contributions of at least four types of participants, from four
different countries, seem relevant:


Producers willing to pay for advertising slots (Germany);



Consumers at whom the ads are targeted (France);



The servers enabling the remote delivery of online advertising services (Ireland);



The investors and entrepreneurs who invented Google’s technology and business (United
States)
Under the current international tax regime, much of Googl’s profit would be allocated not to

France or Germany, but to Ireland (where the relevant legal entity resides). The United States, as the
country of Googl’s R&D and entrepreneurship, has the choice of allocating more of Googl’s profit to
itself (through transfer pricing and controlled foreign corporation rules), but declines to do so. France
levies the DST on Googl’s revenue from advertisements targeted at French consumers, claiming that
French users create value. Yet skeptics ask: What is special about France? One can say, with respect to
persons in each of all four countries above, that “but for” their participation, Googl’ profit would not be
8

realized. Thus, it may seem that value is created in all four countries, with no place being “the” place of
value creation. Assigning Googl’s profit only to France, the skeptics argue, is completely arbitrary.
Such skeptical claims, however, fail to acknowledge certain strong intuitions about how rent
might reasonably be attributed to specific locations. To begin, there are strong reasons to think that
attributing Googl’s profit to Ireland would be mistaken. This is because Googl could have chosen to
locate its server and IP-holding entity in any number of other tax haven jurisdictions. To attract Googl to
itself, Ireland cannot claim any of Googl’ rent.
Next, important arguments can also be made that Googl’s profit cannot be attributed to
Germany. First, note that the production functions of German carmakers do not change because of
Googl’s advertisements targeted at the French. German carmakers are willing to pay for advertisement
on Googl because of the additional producer surplus that they expect to earn by making sales to French
consumers. But this expected producer surplus arises not because of any change in production, but from
an expected shift in the demand curve of French consumers that occurs without anything changing in
Germany. In addition, German carmakers come to Googl for the users of Googl’s search engine; French
users do not come to Googl’s interface because of advertisements for German cars. Googl’s ability to
profit from German carmakers depends on its control of access to French users.
Second, while the marginal cost of placing advertisements is almost zero, selling advertising
slots to German carmakers may have opportunity costs for Googl. If the tolerance of French users of
Googl for advertisements is finite, Googl’s placement of advertisements by German carmakers come at
the expense of other potential advertisers. Thus at least some of the profit Googl earns from German
carmakers could have been made from advertisers elsewhere (even though German carmakers were the
highest bidders). In this sense, too, it would also be wrong to attribute Googl’s profit to Germany.
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These same arguments, however, make it potentially compelling to attribute Googl’s profit to
France. First, the success of Googl’s advertising business in the hypothetical example depends on
Googl’s ability to bring French users onto the platform. Second, the business of targeting ads at French
consumers is non-rival with respect to the business of targeting ads at consumers elsewhere. That is, the
revenue to be earned from providing access to French consumers can be earned only from targeting
French consumers. The rent is attached to France in a way that it is not to Ireland (because of the
existence of many substitutes for Ireland) or to Germany (because German advertisers replace those
from elsewhere for limited advertising space, and because no activity transpires in Germany).
By this line of reasoning, the United States is the only remaining contender with France for
attributing Googl’s rent. Given that user activity on Googl requires both French users and Googl’s unique
technology, why shouldn’t the rent be attributed to the U.S., where the technology is invented and
developed into a successful business model? The reply is that it is again significant that Googl’s
technology can be simultaneously deployed in difference places in the world. If this were not the case—
if the technology being deployed in one place has opportunity costs in it not being deployable
elsewhere—then any rent Googl earns from a given place does not attach to that place. In such a
scenario, if the rent were to be assigned anywhere, it may need to be assigned to the place where the
technology is invented or where its owner resides. However, in the case of non-rival use of technology,
the rent earned from a given place does not displace the earning of rent elsewhere. Thus while any rent
from the technology’s deployment in the U.S. (i.e. for U.S. users) should be attributed to the U.S., the
rent from the technology’s deployment vis-a-vis French users should be attributed to France.
The foregoing arguments suggest that in the hypothetical example of Googl, it is possible to
make meaningful distinctions between the four countries involved in Googl’s operation. The assignment
of Googl’s rent earned from French-targeted ads to France goes beyond the platitude that “but for”
French consumers, Googl cannot make a profit in this way. If our ability to draw such distinctions is
10

stable and coherent, it would be wrong to assert that all we can say about “value creation” is (the
platitude) that all countries are needed to create value.
To demonstrate the stability of the intuitions motivating the reasoning above, consider another
hypothetical example. Another tech company, AirBB, is owned by entrepreneurs from the U.S. who
developed the relevant technology there. AirBB intermediates between property owners and consumers
in need of short-term accommodation. AirBB has a similar cost structure as Googl, i.e. large fixed costs
of investment in technology, additional fixed costs associated with country interfaces, and zero marginal
costs in facilitating transactions. AirBB’s server and IP-holding subsidiary are again in Ireland. AirBB
earns revenue from charging French consumers who book accommodation located in the U.K. After
deducting fixed costs allocable against this revenue, AirBB earns a net profit from this line of business.
As in the case of Googl, French consumers participate in AirBB’s operations. They in fact make
direct payments to AirBB. The reasoning offered above, however, suggests attributing AirBB’s profit not
to France, but to the UK. This is because in AirBB’s business model, revenue is extracted from
consumers, as a result of additional consumer surplus that the digital platform creates. This surplus
arises thanks to the ability of AirBB to reduce transactions costs for property owners and bring them to
market. The UK property owners on AirBB are the counterpart to the French consumers on Googl: just
as Googl pushes the demand curve of French consumers outward, AirBB pushes the supply curve of UK
property owners outward. Both are brought to market through subsidies, and generate opportunities
for earning platform rent that is non-rival with technology deployment elsewhere. Conversely, French
consumers using AirBB are like German carmakers purchasing ads on Googl. Both go to the digital
platform to access opportunities uniquely available from the other side. The use of the platform by each
generates opportunity costs for the platform (due to limited ad slots targeted at consumers, or limited
properties for rental). One can even imagine that just as the German carmakers’ supply curve is
unchanged, the French tourist’s demand curve for UK property remains unchanged.
11

In other words, the logic of rent attribution not only can distinguish between different
participants on the same platform in terms of their roles in “value creation”, but also can distinguish
between the value creation roles of the same participants on different platforms. The AirBB example
shows, for instance, that “value creation” is not a matter of consumer residence.
In the AirBB example, however, the intuition that the platform’s rent should not be attributed to
Ireland remains as before. And assuming that AirBB’s technology can have non-rival deployment in
different countries just like Googl’s search and advertising platform, the rent earned by AirBB from the
participation of UK landlords should not be attributed to the place of the invention of AirBB technology,
or the residence of AirBB’s owner.
Thus far, we have suggested an interpretation of “user value creation” in terms of the
appropriate attribution of platform rent. The definition and measurement of economic rent have been a
subject of controversy and often confusion in the economic literature. In the context of services
provided by digital platforms, the applicable concept we advocate is the Ricardian definition of rent.
That is, rent is the amount earned by a factor of production or a resource in excess of the sum necessary
for this resource to be supplied (Wessel, 1967). Where the crucial resource for a platform is either data
supplied or activities pursued by individual users, it is non-rival at the point of supply and has no
opportunity cost for the resource owner. Hence, a Ricardian rent is transferred from the individual users
to the platform. This leads to a natural justification of the taxation of such rent by the jurisdiction where
the users are located. If the right to tax is the sovereign right of the state over its residents, in exchange
for provision of protection and access to public goods and institutions, then the state is within its rights
to tax the rent appropriated by a (non-resident) platform whenever rent is created by that state’s
resident individuals. Moreover, if an item of pure economic rent can be attributed to a specific
jurisdiction, the government in that jurisdiction would be able not only to claim primary taxing right over
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such rent, but also impose a revenue-maximizing tax that is distinct from other taxes it levies on other
tax bases (such as corporate income that may be neither rent nor location-specific).
Insofar as the above reasoning about platform rent attribution is accepted, two challenges for
international taxation can be immediately identified. First, the location of platform rent (France in the
case of Googl and UK in the case of AirBB) may be completely different from the source of payment
(Germany in the case of Googl and France in the case of AirBB). Because income tax rules frequently
determine the source of income by reference to the source of payment, they do not easily allow the
governments in locations where rents arise to capture such rent. In fact, even tariffs are generally
imposed by countries from which payments are made, which means that they cannot solve the problem
arising from the misalignment between rent location and payment either. Second, there is no coherent
guidance under traditional income taxation about how to locate the return to technology. Whether the
deployment of technology is non-rival has rarely been recognized as a relevant consideration.
It is its attempt to deal with these two challenges that the DST stands out as a policy innovation.
The DST would allow France to impose a levy on payments that Googl receives from Germany, or the UK
to levy a charge on what AirBB receives from France. The DST is thus fundamentally unlike both income
taxes and tariffs. Moreover, it targets platform technologies that have non-rival use, and boldly
challenges the assumption that countries of technology development and ownership alone are entitled
to tax the return to technology.

2. The DST analogized to resource royalties
Taxing LSR is an important policy objective of governments around the world. In fact, in recent
years, researchers have converged on the conclusion that traditional justifications for corporate income
taxation, such as the prevention of shareholder deferral, have lost much relevance (Auerbach et al
2010). Consequently, taxing foreign shareholders on rent earned by domestic corporations (on
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domestically located activities) has come to be seen as the main argument for keeping the source-based
corporate income tax (Auerbach et al 2017, Boadway and Tremblay 2014).
In reality, in addition to the corporate income tax, governments also adopt a rich array of tax
and non-tax instruments to collect revenue from the rent-rich sectors of their economies. In the natural
resource sector, governments can reap revenue through auctioning licenses for resource extraction,
taking public ownership in resource extraction enterprises, or adopting gross-revenue-based royalty
regimes, among other means (Keen and Boadway 2010, Lund 2014). Governments also levy sectorspecific taxes on extraordinary, “excessive-” or “super-” profits to achieve both revenue-raising and
distributional objectives. In all these instances, there is a recognition that when above-normal profits are
earned, governments can impose higher rates of taxation without distorting business decisions. This
policy motivation is relevant even when instruments used for extracting LSR do not perfectly target
economic rent. For example, the corporate income tax, tariffs on import, and export taxes can all
succeed in capturing some LSR, even though they may also lead to the taxation of normal returns, risk
taking, entrepreneurial effort, or savings, and generate corresponding distortions.
One of the most common ways in which governments tax LSR arising from natural resources is
the resource royalty: a flat rate charge on gross revenue.3 Most gross-revenue royalties either do not
take current and capital costs into account, or do so only to very limited degrees. At first blush, this
seems highly distortionary. There will be situations where businesses abandon projects too early
because the royalty makes a project with low margins unprofitable. Businesses are also discouraged
from projects where they face sufficiently high risks of not being able to recover costs. However, many
have also recognized important virtues of resource royalties. Besides their administrative simplicity,
royalties allow governments to collect revenue earlier and expose them to less risk, which is beneficial
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In Canada, for example, gross-revenue royalties levied by provincial governments dominate rent taxes and license
auction revenue collected by the same governments (Boadway and Dachis 2015).
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for governments in less wealthy countries (or sub-national jurisdictions). Moreover, since many firms in
the natural resource sector are vertically integrated and conduct multi-national operations, the
vulnerability of rent or profit taxes to profit shifting is particularly acute. The revenue base of royalties
also makes them robust against tax planning. Royalties can also be used to counter inefficient incentives
of firms to extract resources either too fast or too slowly (Boadway and Keen 2015). Finally, some of the
key objections to royalties, such as that they discourage risk taking, also apply to income taxes and realworld rent taxes. That is, the difficulty of implementing a pure tax on economic rent lends strong
credentials to the resource royalty as a second-best tax. Indeed, most recent commentaries on the
optimal design of natural resource taxation recommend the use of a mix of instruments, in which the
resource royalty continues to play an important role (Keen and Boadway 2015, Lund 2014.)
The DST is straightforwardly analogous to a resource royalty, when it is imposed by a
government on the revenue of a digital platform earning quasi-rent that arises from the government’s
jurisdiction. Indeed, for two reasons that are distinctive about digital platforms, one might argue that
the DST functions even better as a tax on LSR than resource royalties. First, the marginal cost of platform
revenue is often (close to) zero. A tax on revenue is close to being a tax on profit. Moreover, a
company’s shut-down decision will be determined only by average costs, which may be more
predictable than marginal costs and may render it easier to design a low-rate revenue tax that
approximates a tax on profit.
Second, the investment firms make to capture platform rent may differ from upfront
investments in natural resource extraction in some significant ways. Much of this investment may be
aimed at building market share, subsidizing users to begin using a platform and luring them away from
existing services. Indeed, this has been offered as one reason why, even though many platforms
resemble natural monopolies, the current markets are characterized by fragmentation and prevalence
of oligopolies (Weyl and White 2014). All such investments thus generate only private, firm-specific
15

returns and provide more limited benefits to consumers and no benefit to competing firms. As a result,
the no-tax equilibrium in platform competition may well be inefficient. In the presence of such
inefficiencies, the DST can serve as a corrective tax, in addition to being a rent tax on incumbents.
To our knowledge, these two points have not received sufficient notice in the extant literature.
Research modelling distortionary taxation of revenues of digital platforms focuses on their effect on
prices and tax revenues and does not specifically discuss the relationship of deadweight loss to the
marginal cost of production. Similarly, models with different market structures focus on the effect of
competition between platforms on prices, or the effect of taxes on the pricing decisions of a monopoly
platform or competing platforms in an oligopoly. They do not address the issues of potential excessive
entry and the effect of a revenue tax on market structure.4 While these important considerations also lie
beyond the scope of our analysis below, they merit further attention for tax policy analysis.

3. A revenue-based tax as a second-best tax
Critics of the DST have made sweeping claims about how the tax is distortionary and would
simply be passed on to final consumers. In this section, we develop a model illustrating how we think
about the DST’s incidence effects and argue that these effects may fall well within the range of normal
policy tradeoffs between revenue needs and distortionary effects.

a. Theoretical framework
Models of a platform usually describe it as a two-sided market in the spirit of Rochet and Tirole
(2006). There are two types of users, one on each side; the platform sells two separate products
(typically online services) to the users. The users are price-takers. On each side, the users’ demand for
the platform service depends on the number of users on the opposite side (an indirect externality). In
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Existing work tends to simply assume a given market structure in carrying out analysis.
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addition, it may depend on the number of users on own side (a direct externality). Either externality can
be positive or negative. Externalities not reflected in prices create distortion: negative externalities are
over-supplied, and positive externalities are under-supplied (both relative to the socially optimal
quantity). The platform “knows” about the direct and indirect effects among users and can, at least
partly, internalise the externality by charging the users for the opportunity to interact.
A market is two-sided if costs on one side cannot be fully passed through to the other side (for
example, using side transfers).5 In other words, keeping the sum of two prices fixed, a platform can, by
changing the allocation of prices, alter the number of transactions (or participation rates) and increase
profits. It is useful to distinguish between two types of two-sided markets: the non-transaction type and
the transaction type (Filistrucchi et al., 2013). A classic example of the former is media (physical or
internet-based): an interaction between users on two sides is present but not observable; hence a
membership or access fee is feasible but not fees per transaction/interaction, or usage fees. In contrast,
a classic example of a transaction-type two-sided market is payment cards: here transactions are
observable, and a membership fee, a usage fee, or a two-part tariff are all feasible.
In its simplest formulation (Roson, 2005), the objective of a platform is to maximise profit,
𝜋𝑋𝑌 = [𝑝𝑋 + 𝑝𝑌 − 𝑐]𝐼(𝑁𝑋 , 𝑁𝑌 ) + [𝑃𝑋 − 𝐶𝑋 ]𝑁𝑋 + [𝑃𝑌 − 𝐶𝑌 ]𝑁𝑌 − 𝐹
where Nj, j=X,Y, is the number of users of type j, pj is the charge per interaction, or the usage fee,
applied to type-j user, c is the cost of creating an interaction between users, I is the number of
interactions, Pj is the access or membership fee, charged to type-j user, Cj is the cost of creating access
to type-j user, and F is the fixed cost. The market interaction is modelled as a two-stage game. In the

5

Consider the example of heterosexual nightclubs, which often charge entry fee to men but not to women.
Charging men $10 entry fee and letting women in free of charge can attract, say, 50 men and 50 women, while
charging $5 to everyone puts women off, and without women attracts only 70 men. A complete pass-through is
possible if a man and a woman are an established couple who share resources (i.e. can make “side payments” to
each other). Then it does not matter how the entry fee of $10 is split between them. (Filistrucchi et al., 2013)
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first stage, the platform chooses prices, given the availability of pricing instruments and the structure of
the market where the platform operates. In the second stage, the potential users decide whether to join
the platform.
We present an example below of a platform where type-X users are potential buyers of a good
produced and/or sold by type-Y users. The sellers advertise their product on the platform. The
technology allows the platform to register “clicks”; each click is an interaction between two users on the
opposite sides of the platform.6 Thus, it is a transaction-type market, and the platform can charge usage
fee, in addition to the access (membership) fee. To simplify exposition, we abstract from direct
externalities and only consider indirect externalities. We analyse the case of a monopolistic profitmaximising platform which charges only transaction fees (but not access fees) to the users and focus on
the situation where it is optimal to charge only the sellers/advertisers and provide free service to the
potential buyers.7 As is common in the related literature, we further simplify the exposition by assuming
that there is only one type of sellers and only one type of consumers. Moreover, assuming the sellers
can be described by a representative firm, NY is interpreted either as the number of sellers or as the
number of ads posted by the representative seller, or the intensity of advertising.8
We start with deriving the profit-maximising prices and establishing the free-service condition
for buyers. Next, we analyse the incidence of ad valorem tax levied on the platform’s sales revenues in
the presence of indirect externalities. We calculate the effect of tax on the platform and on the two
types of users and relate it to the sign and the extent of the externalities. We show that tax can be

6

One can interpret this as representing either (i) pay-per-click-based advertising offered by Google, Facebook, and
other social media platforms, or (ii) online marketplaces such as Amazon or ASOS.com where the platform charges
sellers commissions.
7
This situation is not overly restrictive: first, many online market places provide free access to buyers, and sales of
advertising spaces is their primary source of revenue; second, it simplifies the exposition but the main results can
be derived also for the case where all users have to pay transaction and/or access fee.
8
We think of a representative firm in the Marshallian sense, i.e. a firm whose supply curve and, in this context,
whose demand for the platform services, coincide with the aggregate supply and aggregate demand of the
industry.
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beneficial (raise the surplus) for buyers or sellers, or, indeed, for both types of users. Finally, we derive
the necessary conditions for the tax to be welfare-improving: it must be the case that tax leads to an
increase in the number of advertisers on the platform. This happens when both indirect externalities are
positive with at least one being sufficiently weak, or when the indirect externality from sellers to buyers
is negative (more sellers/advertisers make platform less attractive for buyers). If tax leads to the loss of
welfare, in the latter case the welfare loss will tend to be smaller. The detrimental effect of tax is the
strongest when both indirect externalities are positive and strong, - that is, when platform internalizes
the externalities by bringing the two types of users together and charging usage fees.

b. Profit maximisation by a monopoly platform
The platform charges buyers and advertisers a usage fee. There is an ad valorem tax at rate t on
the revenue earned from advertising by the platform9. The objective of the platform is to maximise the
net of tax profit, taking the tax rate as given:
𝜋𝑋𝑌 = [𝑝𝑋 +

𝑝𝑌
1+𝑡

− 𝑐] 𝐼(𝑁𝑋 , 𝑁𝑌 ) − 𝐹,
𝜕𝐼

𝜕𝐼

In addition to the standard assumption on the number of interactions, 𝜕𝑁 > 0, 𝜕𝑁 > 0 , we
𝑋

𝑌

make the following assumptions about NX and NY :
𝜕𝑁

𝜕𝑁

Assumption 1. 𝑁𝑋 = 𝑁𝑋 (𝑝𝑋 , 𝑁𝑌 ), 𝜕𝑝 𝑋 < 0, 𝜕𝑁𝑋 ≠ 0.
𝑋

𝜕𝑁

𝑌

𝜕𝑁

Assumption 2. 𝑁𝑌 = 𝑁𝑌 (𝑝𝑌 , 𝑁𝑋 ), 𝜕𝑝 𝑌 < 0, 𝜕𝑁𝑌 > 0.
𝑌

𝑋

These assumptions state, first, that the demand for the platform services is decreasing in price. In
addition, Assumption 1 states that for any given transaction fee the buyers’ demand for the platform

9

The analysis can be easily extended to the case where revenue from buyers’ usage fees are also subject to tax.
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service can be either higher or lower, the greater is the number of ads to which they are exposed.10
Assumption 2 states that for any given transaction fee the advertisers’ demand for the platform services
is higher, the more potential buyers are using the platform. These indirect externalities are partly
internalised by the platform through the fees charged to the users.
As in Rochet and Tirole (2003), we assume that 𝐼(𝑁𝑋 , 𝑁𝑌 ) = 𝑁𝑋 𝑁𝑌 . If there is no restriction on
prices, the profit-maximising prices satisfy the first-order necessary conditions,
𝜕𝜋𝑋𝑌
𝑝𝑌
𝜕𝑁𝑌
𝑑𝑁𝑋
= [𝑝𝑋 +
− 𝑐] [𝑁𝑋
+ 𝑁𝑌 ]
+ 𝑁𝑋 𝑁𝑌 ,
𝜕𝑝𝑋
1+𝑡
𝜕𝑁𝑋
𝑑𝑝𝑋

(1)

0=

(2) 0 =

𝜕𝜋𝑋𝑌
𝑝𝑌
𝜕𝑁𝑋
𝑑𝑁𝑌
1
= [𝑝𝑋 +
− 𝑐] [𝑁𝑌
+ 𝑁𝑋 ]
+
𝑁 𝑁 ,
𝜕𝑝𝑌
1+𝑡
𝜕𝑁𝑌
𝑑𝑝𝑌 1 + 𝑡 𝑋 𝑌

In many situations platform pricing is skewed (Bolt and Tieman 2008; Schmalensee 2013): price
paid by one type of users is much lower than the price paid by the other type, and often platform
provides free service to users on one side. Bolt and Tieman (2008) analysed the situation where profit is
not a globally concave function of prices, and so zero price for users on one side is a corner solution for
profit maximisation. Schmalensee (2013) showed that zero price on one side can be profit-maximising
when profit is globally concave, but the demands on two sides are very different. Below, we establish
when the platform will not charge users in group X (the buyers) in the presence of indirect externalities.
We assume that the profit is globally concave, and the second-order condition holds. That is, the
Hessian matrix of the second-order partial derivatives of profit with respect to prices is negative
definite, so that its determinant 𝐻 is negative.

10

One can think of a platform with positive indirect externality from advertisers to buyers as a market place,
whereas a negative indirect externality from advertisers to buyers may exist on a social media platform if buyers
dislike the adverts. More generally, the effect can be non-monotone, - for example, buyers may feel that adverts
are useful but become irritated if there is too many of them.
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We are interested in the situation where the solutions 𝑝𝑋 , 𝑝𝑌 to the system of equations (1)-(2)
are such that 𝑝𝑋 < 0, 𝑝𝑌 > 0. In particular, this implies that

𝜕𝜋𝑋𝑌
𝜕𝑝𝑋

< 0 for all 𝑝𝑋 ≥ 0.

We introduce the following notations:

𝜀𝑋 ≡ −

𝑝𝑋 𝜕𝑁𝑋
𝑝𝑌 𝑑𝑁𝑌
> 0, 𝜀𝑌 ≡ −
> 0,
𝑁𝑋 𝜕𝑝𝑋
𝑁𝑌 𝑑𝑝𝑌

𝜎𝑋𝑌 ≡

𝑁𝑌 𝜕𝑁𝑋
𝑁𝑋 𝜕𝑁𝑌
≠ 0, 𝜎𝑌𝑋 ≡
> 0.
𝑁𝑋 𝜕𝑁𝑌
𝑁𝑌 𝜕𝑁𝑋

The first two quantities are the standard price elasticities of demand of type-X and type-Y users,
and the last two quantities are the elasticities of demand (or number) of users on one side of the
platform with respect to the demand (or number) of users on the opposite side. For example, 𝜎𝑋𝑌 is
defined as the percentage change in the number of consumers viewing the ads in response to one per
cent increase in the number of ads, and it captures the extent of the indirect externality.
Using these notations, rewrite condition

(3)

𝜕𝜋𝑋𝑌
𝜕𝑝𝑋

< 0 at 𝑝𝑋 = 0 as

1
𝑝𝑌
1 𝜕𝑁𝑋
<(
− 𝑐) [−
]
1 + 𝜎𝑌𝑋
1+𝑡
𝑁𝑋 𝑝𝑋 𝑝

𝑋 =0

This is more likely, the stronger is the indirect externality from buyers to sellers (larger 𝜎𝑌𝑋 ) and the
more price-sensitive is the buyers' demand for platform services near zero price (a small increase in
price from zero leads to a large drop in the quantity demanded).11
If subsidising users is not feasible, the platform will provide free service to buyers and charge
sellers the price that solves

(4)

11

𝜇𝑌 (𝑡) =

1
,
𝜀𝑌 [1 + 𝜎𝑋𝑌 ]

See Schmalensee (2011) for the detailed analysis of the conditions for negative optimal prices.
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where 𝜇𝑌 (𝑡) ≡

𝑝𝑌 −[1+𝑡]𝑐
𝑝𝑌

is the monopoly’s price mark-up over tax-adjusted marginal cost.12 Equation

(4) is the inverse elasticity rule modified to account for the indirect externality. One can see that positive
indirect externality from sellers to buyers lowers the mark-up,13 whereas negative externality makes it
higher.
1

The platform makes positive profit as long as 𝜎𝑋𝑌 > −1 and 𝜀𝑌 > 1+𝜎

𝑋𝑌

> 0. This condition

allows for positive or not too strong negative externality from sellers to buyers. In the context of
advertising, the buyers may like or dislike advertising, but the disliking should not be too strong.
The next step is to calculate the effect of tax on the prices and user demand for platform
services.

c. Effects of a revenue-based tax on platform pricing and user demand
We are now in the position to investigate how the burden of an increase in tax will be
distributed among the market participants. Note first that, when the marginal cost of user interaction is
negligible, the sales revenue is nearly identical to (variable) profit. In this case tax has little or no effect
on the pricing decision.
When the marginal cost of user interaction is positive and non-negligible, an increase in tax
would lead, in general, to a change in prices. In the presence of externalities the price on either side of
the platform can increase or decrease, depending on the sensitivity of the users’ demands.

12

𝑝

An alternative definition of markup used in the economic literature is 𝑚 ≡ , where p is price and c is marginal
𝑚−1

𝑐

cost; it is related to our definition by 𝜇 =
.
𝑚
13
If a monopoly can also charge access fee, or if profit-maximising usage fees are positive for all users, it is possible
that for at least one type of users the mark-up is negative, i.e. the profit-maximising price can be below (taxadjusted) marginal cost.
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i.

Tax effect on usage fees
To calculate the effect of a marginal increase in the tax rate on the usage fee charged to
advertisers we differentiate the first-order condition with respect to the tax rate and apply the envelope
function theorem. The expression we obtain is the following:

(5)

𝑑𝑝𝑌
1 𝑁𝑋 𝑁𝑌 [1 − 𝜇𝑌 (𝑡)]
=
.
𝑑𝑡
−𝐻 [1 + 𝑡]2 𝜇𝑌 (𝑡)

Clearly, as long as the mark-up is between zero and one (this ensures that variable profit is
positive), the usage fee increases with tax. This increases the advertising expenditure for sellers and
depresses their profits. In the context of the debate about adopting the DST, this means that a DST
imposed on Google may result in Google charging higher advertising fees (again assuming that the
marginal cost of ads is positive), and a DST imposed on Amazon Marketplace may result in higher
fees/commissions charged to online sellers. The country imposing the DST, however, may be indifferent
to such price increases faced by foreign producers and sellers, especially if such increases in
intermediate inputs do not lead to higher consumer prices at home.14 Such a country should care more
about price increases (and reduced profits) faced by domestic producers/sellers. However, even such
increases may be viewed as a reasonable cost (which may be compensated through separate fiscal
transfers to domestic sellers) given that additional revenue can be extracted from the profit of the
platform itself— as will be seen below.
The tax-shift rate, or the proportion of tax passed by the platform to the advertisers, is given by

𝜌𝑌 ≡

1 + 𝑡 𝑑𝑝𝑌
1 − 𝜇𝑌
=
,
∆
𝑝𝑌 𝑑𝑡
2−
[1 + 𝜎𝑋𝑌 ]2

14

In the standard framework, advertising expenditure is part of the fixed cost for the producer and so does not
affect the supply curve. The equilibrium price may change because of a shift in demand caused by the change in
the intensity of advertising.
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where
∆≡

2 2
1+𝜎𝑋𝑌 𝑝𝑌
𝜕 𝑁𝑌
2
2
𝜀𝑌 𝑁𝑌 𝜕𝑝𝑌

𝑁 2 𝜕2 𝑁𝑋
2
𝑋 𝜕𝑁𝑌

+ 2𝜎𝑋𝑌 + 𝑁𝑌

.

One can see that the tax-shift rate for advertisers can be greater or less than unity, depending
on the curvature of the advertisers’ demand for platform service and the extent of the indirect
externality from sellers to buyers. Specifically, 𝜌𝑌 > 1 (the platform over-shifts tax on advertisers) if
∆> [1 + 𝜎𝑋𝑌 ]2 and 𝜀𝑌 >

1+𝜎𝑋𝑌
.
∆−[1+𝜎𝑋𝑌 ]2

It is possible that the tax is not passed onto buyers. By continuity, if condition (3) holds without
tax, it continues to hold for a marginal increase in tax rate from zero. Since higher t leads to higher 𝑝𝑌 , it
is possible that condition (3) also continues to hold as the tax rate rises from zero to some finite t>0.
Assuming this is the case, the platform will continue providing free service to buyers after the tax is
introduced.

ii.

Tax effect on user demand
The next step is to find the effect of tax on quantities, or the demand of users for the platform's
service. Let 𝜈𝑋𝑡 , 𝜈𝑌𝑡 denote the tax elasticity of user demand for buyers and advertisers, respectively:
𝜈𝑋𝑡 ≡

1 + 𝑡 𝜕𝑁𝑋
1 + 𝑡 𝜕𝑁𝑌
; 𝜈𝑌𝑡 ≡
.
𝑁𝑋 𝜕𝑡
𝑁𝑌 𝜕𝑡

We assume that tax has no effect on the free provision of platform service to buyers. Therefore, the only
effect on the demand of buyers for platform services is through the effect of tax on the number of
advertisers: 𝜈𝑋𝑡 = 𝜎𝑋𝑌 𝜈𝑌𝑡 . For advertisers we obtain
𝜈𝑌𝑡 =

𝜀𝑌 𝜌𝑌
.
1 − 𝜎𝑋𝑌 𝜎𝑌𝑋

24

One can see that the demand for platform services from buyers and advertisers can either increase or
decrease with tax, depending on the sign and strength of the indirect externalities. The following cases
are possible:
Case A. 𝜎𝑋𝑌 𝜎𝑌𝑋 > 1. In this case 𝜈𝑌𝑡 < 0. The number of advertisers on the platform falls. Since 𝜎𝑌𝑋 > 0
by assumption, for this to be the case we need 𝜎𝑋𝑌 > 1⁄𝜎𝑌𝑋 : externality from advertisers on buyers'
demand must be positive, and at least one of the indirect externalities must be sufficiently strong. In this
case the number of buyers using the platform also falls: fewer sellers/advertisers make the platform less
attractive for buyers.
Case B. 𝜎𝑋𝑌 𝜎𝑌𝑋 < 1. In this case 𝜈𝑌𝑡 > 0. Note that, since 𝜎𝑌𝑋 > 0 by assumption, this outcome is
always the case when buyers dislike the adverts (𝜎𝑋𝑌 < 0). This resembles over-provision of negative
externality, although the mechanism here is different. More generally, tax leads to more adverts in two
sub-cases outlined below. In one of these sub-cases, positive effect of tax on both the usage fee and the
number of adverts is also possible when both externalities are positive, as long as they are not too
strong, or at least one externality is sufficiently weak.
Case B.1. 𝜎𝑋𝑌 < 0. When buyers dislike the adverts tax leads to more advertisers (𝜈𝑌𝑡 > 0) and fewer
buyers (𝜈𝑋𝑡 < 0).
Case B.2. 0 < 𝜎𝑋𝑌 < 1⁄𝜎𝑌𝑋 . Buyers like the adverts, and at least one of the indirect externalities is
sufficiently weak. In this case tax leads to more adverts (𝜈𝑌𝑡 > 0) and more buyers (𝜈𝑋𝑡 > 0).
We summarized these cases in Table 1.
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d. Incidence of tax
The incidence of tax, or the pass-through rate, is defined in terms of its effect on the consumer
surplus and the producer surplus (Weyl and Fabinger, 2013). When the producer is a monopoly, the
producer surplus is the variable profit.
In the context of the two-sided platform, the platform is the producer, and there are two types
of consumers (users), the buyers and the sellers/advertisers. Let 𝑝̅𝑗 (𝑡) be the choke price for users of
type j at tax rate t, and let 𝑝𝑗∗ (𝑡) be the usage fee charged by the platform to the user of type j. Recall
that each user can interact with every user on the opposite side. Then the consumer surplus for each
type is given by
𝑝̅𝑋 (𝑡)

𝐶𝑆𝑋 (𝑡) ≡ ∫

𝑁𝑋 (𝑝𝑋 ; 𝑁𝑌 (𝑝𝑌 (𝑡)), 𝑁𝑋 (∙)) 𝑁𝑌 (𝑝𝑌 (𝑡)), 𝑁𝑋 (∙) 𝑑𝑝𝑋 ,

∗ (𝑡)
𝑝𝑋

𝑝̅𝑌 (𝑡)

𝐶𝑆𝑌 (𝑡) ≡ ∫

∗ (𝑡)
𝑝𝑌

𝑁𝑌 (𝑝𝑌 ; 𝑁𝑋 (𝑝𝑋 (𝑡)), 𝑁𝑌 (∙)) 𝑁𝑋 (𝑝𝑋 (𝑡)), 𝑁𝑌 (∙) 𝑑𝑝𝑌 .

The choke prices are defined by
𝑁𝑋 (𝑝̅𝑋 (𝑡); 𝑁𝑌 (𝑝𝑌 (𝑡)), 𝑁𝑋 (∙)) = 0
𝑁𝑌 (𝑝̅𝑌 (𝑡); 𝑁𝑋 (𝑝𝑋 (𝑡)), 𝑁𝑌 (∙)) = 0
We assume, as before, that condition (3) holds; then 𝑝𝑋∗ (𝑡) = 0 for the relevant values of t and,
thus, does not depend on t. In this case 𝑝̅𝑌 (𝑡), the choke price for advertisers, also does not depend on
t. For the tax elasticity of 𝑝̅𝑋 (𝑡), the choke price for buyers, we have
1 + 𝑡 𝑑𝑝̅𝑋
𝜀𝑌
𝜎𝑋𝑌 𝜌𝑌
=−
(𝑝̅
)
𝑝̅𝑋 𝑑𝑡
𝜀𝑋 𝑋 1 − 𝜎𝑋𝑌 𝜎𝑌𝑋

26

In particular, the buyers' choke price does not change with tax if 𝜀𝑋 (𝑝̅𝑋 ) → ∞, which is the case
𝑑𝑁

whenever the marginal change in quantity demanded at the choke price is finite, | 𝑑𝑝 𝑋 |
𝑋

𝜎

The choke price of buyers falls with tax if 1−𝜎 𝑋𝑌𝜎

𝑋𝑌 𝑌𝑋

< ∞.
𝑝̅𝑋

> 0. This corresponds to Case B.2: buyers like

adverts, and tax leads to more adverts and more buyers on the platform. Buyers' demand for platform
services rotates counterclockwise: the vertical intercept moves down, and the horizontal intercept
𝜎

moves to the right. In the opposite case, when 1−𝜎 𝑋𝑌𝜎

𝑋𝑌 𝑌𝑋

< 0, the buyers’ choke price rises. This

corresponds to Cases A and B.1. In these two cases the buyers' demand curve rotates clockwise: the
vertical intercept moves up, and the horizontal intercept moves to the left, so that the number of buyers
on the platform falls. In Case A buyers like the adverts, and with fewer sellers the platform becomes less
attractive. In Case B.1 there is more sellers, but the buyers dislike the adverts, - again, the platform
becomes less attractive for buyers when tax is introduced.
Finally, we calculate the change in the surplus, or the incidence of tax on buyers and sellers.
𝑝̅𝑋 (𝑡)

1 + 𝑡 𝑑𝐶𝑆𝑋 ∫0
=
𝐶𝑆𝑋 𝑑𝑡

[1 + 𝜎𝑋𝑌 ]𝜈𝑌𝑡 𝑁𝑋 𝑁𝑌 𝑑𝑝𝑋
𝑝̅ (𝑡)

∫0 𝑋

𝑁𝑋 𝑁𝑌 𝑑𝑝𝑋

This quantity is positive when either 𝜎𝑋𝑌 < 0, 𝜈𝑌𝑡 < 0, or 𝜎𝑋𝑌 > 0, 𝜈𝑌𝑡 > 0. Looking at Table 1, one can
see that tax raises buyers’ surplus if 0 < 𝜎𝑋𝑌 < 1⁄𝜎𝑌𝑋 (Case B.2): both indirect externalities are positive
and at least one is sufficiently weak (provided that buyers continue enjoying free service after the tax is
introduced). Intuitively, the buyers benefit from tax when they like adverts and tax raises the number of
adverts on the platform. In two other cases, for 𝜎𝑋𝑌 < 0 and 𝜎𝑋𝑌 > 1⁄𝜎𝑌𝑋 , buyers’ surplus falls.
For the tax incidence on sellers we have
𝑝̅ (𝑡)

∫𝑝∗𝑌(𝑡) 𝜈𝑌𝑡 [1 + 𝜎𝑋𝑌 ]𝑁𝑋 𝑁𝑌 𝑑𝑝𝑌
1 + 𝑡 𝑑𝐶𝑆𝑌
𝑁𝑋 𝑁𝑌 𝑝𝑌∗ (𝑡)
= −𝜌𝑌 𝑝̅ (𝑡)
+ 𝑌
.
𝑝̅ (𝑡)
𝑌
𝐶𝑆𝑌 𝑑𝑡
∫𝑝∗ (𝑡) 𝑁𝑋 𝑁𝑌 𝑑𝑝𝑌
∫𝑝∗𝑌(𝑡) 𝑁𝑋 𝑁𝑌 𝑑𝑝𝑌
𝑌

𝑌
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The first term is always negative. The second term is also negative when 𝜈𝑌𝑡 < 0, which is the case when
𝜎𝑋𝑌 > 1⁄𝜎𝑌𝑋 (Case A), and it is positive when 𝜈𝑌𝑡 < 0, which is the case when 𝜎𝑋𝑌 < 1⁄𝜎𝑌𝑋 (Cases B.1
and B.2). The overall effect of tax on sellers’ surplus can be positive if
𝑝̅ (𝑡)

(5)

𝜌𝑌 |𝑝𝑌∗ (𝑡) <

∫𝑝∗𝑌(𝑡) 𝜈𝑌𝑡 [1 + 𝜎𝑋𝑌 ]𝑁𝑋 𝑁𝑌 (𝑝𝑌 ,∙)𝑑𝑝𝑌
𝑌

𝑁𝑋 𝑁𝑌 (𝑝𝑌∗ (𝑡),∙) 𝑝𝑌∗ (𝑡)

.

This is more likely to hold, the lower is the sellers’ usage fee, the lower is tax elasticity of the sellers’
usage fee, the higher is the tax elasticity of sellers’ demand for platform service, and the higher is
(positive) indirect externality from sellers to buyers.
Finally, one can see that it is possible that users on both sides of the platform can benefit from
tax. This can happen in Case B.2, 0 < 𝜎𝑋𝑌 < 1⁄𝜎𝑌𝑋 , if condition (5) holds.
The profit of the platform falls when tax is introduced (otherwise the platform would not be
maximizing profits in the absence of tax). Thus, the burden of tax is always on the platform, but not
1+𝑡 𝑑𝜋𝑋𝑌
𝑋𝑌 𝑑𝑡

necessarily on buyers or sellers. Tax incidence on the platform is defined as 𝜋

, and it is not

difficult to show that
1 + 𝑡 𝑑𝜋𝑋𝑌
𝜌𝑌
= −[1 + 𝜎𝑋𝑌 ]𝜀𝑌 + 𝜈𝑋𝑡 + 𝜈𝑌𝑡 = [1 + 𝜎𝑋𝑌 ]𝜀𝑌 [
− 1].
𝜋𝑋𝑌 𝑑𝑡
1 − 𝜎𝑋𝑌 𝜎𝑌𝑋
The first two factors in the last expression are positive by assumption. The quantity in the last
brackets is always negative in Case A: not surprisingly, the tax is the most detrimental when both
indirect externalities are positive and sufficiently strong. With tax the number of users on both sides
drops and the platform’s profit loss is the strongest. In two other cases, when either the indirect
externality from sellers to buyers is negative, or both externalities are positive but at least one is
sufficiently weak, the number of sellers increases with tax, and this has countervailing effect on the
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platform’s profit. This countervailing effect is further strengthened when the number of buyers also
increases with tax. Thus, the platform’s profit loss is the smallest in Case B.2.

e. Welfare effect of tax
Define the total private sector welfare as the sum of surpluses of the users and the profit of the
platform, and define the social welfare, W, as the sum of the tax revenues and the total private welfare.
Tax elasticity of social welfare, 𝜔 ≡

1+𝑡 𝑑𝑊
,
𝑊 𝑑𝑡

𝑝̅ (𝑡)

𝜔=

is then given by

𝑝̅ (𝑡)

∫0 𝑋 [1 + 𝜎𝑋𝑌 ]𝜈𝑌𝑡 𝑁𝑋 𝑁𝑌 𝑑𝑝𝑋 + ∫𝑝∗𝑌(𝑡) [1 + 𝜎𝑋𝑌 ]𝜈𝑌𝑡 𝑁𝑋 𝑁𝑌 𝑑𝑝𝑌 + [𝑝𝑌∗ (𝑡) − 𝑐][1 + 𝜎𝑋𝑌 ]𝜈𝑌𝑡 𝑁𝑋 𝑁𝑌
𝑌

𝑝̅ (𝑡)
∫0 𝑋 𝑁𝑋 𝑁𝑌

𝑝̅ (𝑡)

𝑑𝑝𝑋 + ∫𝑝∗𝑌(𝑡) 𝑁𝑋 𝑁𝑌 𝑑𝑝𝑌 + [𝑝𝑌∗ (𝑡) − 𝑐]𝑁𝑋 𝑁𝑌
𝑌

The sign of the change in the social welfare is ambiguous, except for the Case A. In this case the social
welfare unambiguously falls with tax, since all three terms in the numerator are negative. Tax has the
largest deteriorating effect on private welfare when both indirect externalities are positive and
sufficiently strong. Case B.2 is the opposite: since in this case the negative effect of tax on profit is the
smallest, the overall detrimental effect of tax on welfare is also the smallest, as both buyers and sellers
benefit from tax. For the tax to be welfare-improving it is necessary (but not sufficient) that condition
𝜎𝑋𝑌 𝜎𝑌𝑋 < 1 holds. Effectively, tax can be welfare-improving only if it leads to an increase in
advertising.
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Table 1. The effect of ad valorem tax levied on platform’s sales revenue.
B.1: 𝜎𝑋𝑌 < 0

B.2: 0 < 𝜎𝑋𝑌 < 1⁄𝜎𝑌𝑋

A: 𝜎𝑋𝑌 > 1⁄𝜎𝑌𝑋

𝑑𝑁𝑋 ⁄𝑑𝑡

−

+

−

𝑑𝑁𝑌 ⁄𝑑𝑡

+

+

−

𝑑𝐶𝑆𝑋 ⁄𝑑𝑡

−

+

−

𝑑𝐶𝑆𝑌 ⁄𝑑𝑡

+/−

+/−

−

𝑑𝜋𝑋𝑌 ⁄𝑑𝑡

+/−

+/−

−

𝑑𝑊 ⁄𝑑𝑡

+/−

+/−

−

Nj is the demand (number) of type-j users; CSj is users’ surplus; 𝜋𝑋𝑌 is the profit of the platform; W is the
social welfare.

The efficiency-enhancing role of taxes on platform revenues is formally analyzed in Kind et al.
(2008). In their model the monopoly platform charges access fee (there is no transaction/usage fee) and
pays both specific and ad valorem tax. They show that the monopoly output can be larger than optimal,
and that this inefficiency can be reduced by imposing negative value-added tax or positive specific tax.
Our approach is different: instead of calculating social optimum we calculate the incidence of a given tax
on the platform and the users and derive the necessary conditions for the tax to be welfare-improving.

4. Taxing Platform Rent and the Future
The current global debate about the DST focuses almost entirely on its role in promoting reforms of
international income taxation. Specifically, its desirability is taken to hinge on the possibility of countries
coming to an agreement about a reallocation of taxing rights under their income taxes: the DST is
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considered necessary only if countries cannot agree on such a reallocation and continue to adhere to
the existing income tax treaty framework. Not only business lobbies, but also the OECD and EU and even
individual governments advocating the DST, have promoted the notion that the DST merely anticipates
the replacement of the current assignment of taxing rights, and it could not justifiably be imposed in the
long term on top of the corporate income tax.
Our analogy of the DST to taxes on resource rent in general and resource royalties in particular,
however, casts doubt on whether this is a compelling way to assess the DST’s merits. Countries have
long attempted to extract a portion of LSR through a wide variety of tax and non-tax instruments.
Whenever they thus extract a share of LSR earned by foreign investors, abstractly speaking, taxing rights
among nations are being allocated. Yet most of such rent taxes, not to mention non-tax instruments for
extracting private rent, are not subject to international coordination. If, for example, one country
discovers a new mineral resource and imposes export tariffs on mineral exports, it would be quite odd
for other countries to demand that the country make income tax concessions or modify its income tax
treaties.
Overall, we see the DST not as some arbitrary way of tinkering with the corporate income tax to
achieve goals that could be accomplished otherwise. Instead, the DST, even while quite simple in design,
is a genuinely innovative tax by virtue of targeting a genuinely novel tax base, i.e. platform rent that is
location specific. The uncertainties and compliance costs associated with its introduction must be
viewed in light of this fundamental benefit.
Indeed, it may be useful to conceive the DST as anticipating certain long-term challenges arising
from asymmetrical technological development. According to one narrative (Lee 2017) within recent
debates about labor-replacing technology based on artificial intelligence (AI), AI-fueled automation will
replace most low-skilled and much high-skilled labor in rich and poor countries alike. In high-income
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countries, employment may shift towards service jobs, and because of the overall shrinking labor share,
much of it would have to be financed from public purse. High-income countries can support such public
spending through high rates of taxation imposed on firms reaping the returns to automated production.
However, the distribution of technology firms is likely to be highly uneven among countries, with firms
in countries such as the U.S. and China that have large populations and invested early and effectively in
AI taking an insurmountable lead in AI research and application.15 Most other countries without such
firms would not have a corporate tax base with which to supplement or replace their dwindling labor
income tax bases. By the same token, they would also lack capacity to finance the public purchase of
newer, non-automated services. In other words, automation could create extreme inter-nation
inequality through eroding the labor tax base of technology-poor countries, while augmenting the tax
base of technology-rich countries.
While this dystopian story is still speculative, it is consistent with recent economic analyses of
the existing international tax and transfer system. An important theme of the international taxation
literature has been the mobility of capital and of production locations. Unless there is location-specific
rent in the country of production, such country is unlikely to capture much of the return to capital, and
automation would only make this problem worse. An alternative approach is to allocate taxing power
according to where consumption occurs. However, this approach would favor the rich countries that can
afford high levels of consumption, thereby aggravating existing inter-nation inequality and potentially
worsening inequality in the future.
The approach to identifying LSR that we describe in this paper, however, suggests another
approach to allocating taxing power. The rent earned by technology, even if delivered from a mobile
remote location, need not be treated as mobile itself. Instead it can be attributed to jurisdictions

15

For academic work touching on this theme, see Goldfarb and Trefler (2018), and Korinek and Stiglitz (2017). See
also Acemoglu et al (2017).
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without whose active participation the rent would not arise. Moreover, a tax base does not need to be
associated with streams of payment: a jurisdiction in which consumers obtain services “for free”—in
exchange for their personal data, attention, etc.—may still lay claim to a tax base if their citizens
critically enable the generation of profits. All that is required is that some resource in the country
generates a Ricardian rent—even if the party that can monetize such rent, e.g. a digital platform
company, operates remotely.
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Appendix. The definitions and measurement of rent.
Many tax instruments used by government to capture some of the economic rent earned by
firms, such as the corporate income tax or tariffs on import and export, typically are not based on the
precisely measured economic rent. The very definition of rent is a subject of controversy and often
confusion in economics literature (see Suenaga, 2016, for a comprehensive list of sources and citations).
The Ricardian definition of rent is the amount earned by a factor of production or a resource in
excess of the sum necessary for this resource to be supplied. In contrast, the Paretian definition of rent
is the earning in excess of the sum necessary to keep this resource in its present occupation (Wessel,
1967). Thus, in the latter definition a rent is earning accrued to the resource in its specific use, in excess
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of the opportunity cost. A third, Marshallian definition of rent refers to the surplus in excess of the
amount to induce supply of a resource fixed in the short run, and in this sense is a type of quasi-rent
(Brar, 1977). Rent can also be defined as a differential surplus which takes into account non-pecuniary
advantages of the resource owner (Mishan, 1959).
The definition and the measurement also depend crucially on whether the rent refers to a firm,
an industry, or an economy. Thus, according to Shepherd (1970), for a competitive industry the rent in
the Pareto sense is equivalent to the producer surplus and is measured as the area between the longrun supply curve and the price line. Marshallian rent is measured as the area above the industry’s shortrun supply curve (Michan, 1968). Brar (1977) demonstrates that the estimates of rent differ depending
on the nature of the supply curve (short-run or long-run) and on the concept of rent (Ricardian,
Paretian, or Marshallian).
Varian (2010) starts with Ricardian definition of rent and uses an example with land owned by a
farm to conclude that, since economic profit must be zero, rent is “whatever it takes to drive profits to
zero” (p. 425). Rent is further defined as the difference between the revenues and variable cost
(equation 23.1 on p. 425), thus being equivalent to the producer’s surplus. For an individual producer
the rent can thus be calculated as the “area to the left of the marginal cost curve” (p. 425).
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